Started: `UntrustedPathRules` path-check function pointer table. Currently incomplete, and does not handle multiple masks (i.e X | Y -> X || Y).

Fortune for rng's current commit: Future blessing − 末吉

Cargo.toml

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ bitflags = { version = "1.3.2", optional = true }
 getrandom = "0.1"
 lazy_static = { version = "1.4.0", optional = true }
 libc = { version = "0.2.126", optional = true }
+readable-perms = "0.1.3"
 regex = { version = "1.6.0", optional = true }
 
 [features]

src/plugin/api.rs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+//! The plugin API.

src/plugin/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 //! Allow loading plugins at runtime.
 
+//TODO: Move this to a library crate and re-export it as `plugin::api`
+pub mod api;
+
 mod loader;
 mod searcher;

src/plugin/searcher.rs

@@ -28,9 +28,12 @@ pub mod locations {
 
     bitflags! {
 	/// The rules a file in an unstructed lookup path must qualify for it to be considered for plugin candidacy.
-	pub struct UntrustedPathRules : u32
+	pub struct UntrustedPathRules : u8
 	{
 	    /// No restrictions on the file.
+	    ///
+	    /// # Note
+	    /// Must always be 0.
 	    const UNRESTRICTED = 0;
 	    /// Name ends in valid string from `LOOKUP_NAME_MATCHES_IN_UNTRUSTED`.
 	    const NAME_MATCH = 1 << 0;
@@ -46,8 +49,154 @@ pub mod locations {
 	    const USER_OWNED_ONLY = 1 << 5;
 	    /// Disqualify files that are accessible at all by anyone other than the current user (or root, which can accesss everything.)
 	    const USER_ACCESSIBLE_ONLY = 1 << 6;
+	    /// Disallow *all* untrusted files.
+	    ///
+	    /// # Note
+	    /// Must be highest value.
+	    const INACCESSIBLE = 1 << 7;
 	}
     }
+
+    impl UntrustedPathRules
+    {
+	/// Contains function pointers for checking paths with every combination (**any**, not **all** in the mask) of rules in `UntrustedPathRules`.
+	///
+	/// Invalid functions will either:
+	///  * Panic if they are *never* supposed to be called in the pipeline (e.g `NAME_MATCH`.)
+	///  * Return false immediately.
+	pub const RULE_FUNCTION_CHECK_TABLE: [&'static (dyn Fn (&Path, &str) -> bool + 'static); 256] = Self::generate_rule_table();
+	
+	/// Generate a table of 256 entries that which each single, or **OR**-combined mask entry of `UntrustedPathRules` has a corresponding path check function.
+	///
+	/// Invalid functions will either:
+	///  * Panic if they are *never* supposed to be called in the pipeline (e.g `NAME_MATCH`.)
+	///  * Return false immediately.
+	pub(super) const fn generate_rule_table() -> [&'static (dyn Fn (&Path, &str) -> bool + 'static); 256]
+	{
+	    let mut rule_table = Self::generate_pruned_rule_table();
+	    //TODO: Add in combinations via ORing its single-bit entry functions.
+	    rule_table
+	}
+	/// Generate a table of 256 entries that which each **single** (not combinations of) entry of `UntrustedPathRules` has a corresponding path check function.
+	#[inline] 
+	const fn generate_pruned_rule_table() -> [&'static (dyn Fn (&Path, &str) -> bool + 'static); 256]
+	{
+	    type RuleCheckFunc<'a> = (dyn Fn(&Path, &str) -> bool + 'a);
+	    #[inline] 
+	    const fn disallow(_: &Path, _: &str) -> bool { false }
+	    
+	    let mut table: [&'static RuleCheckFunc; 256] = [&(disallow as fn(&Path, &str) -> bool); 256];
+
+	    macro_rules! set {
+		($func:expr) => {
+		    {
+			let func: &'static RuleCheckFunc<'static> = &($func);
+			func
+		    }
+		};
+		($name:ident => $func:expr) => {
+		    
+		    let bits = Self::$name.bits as usize;
+		    
+		    // Fill in compositions based on previous entries into `table`.
+		    let func: &'static RuleCheckFunc<'static> = set!($func);
+		    /*let rv = {
+		    let mut i: usize = 1;
+		    //XXX: WHY doesn't this work???
+		    while i < bits {
+		    let prev = table[i];
+		    
+		    table[bits | i] = set!(|path: &Path, name: &str| -> bool {
+		    prev(path, name) && func(path, name)
+		});
+		    
+		    i += 1;
+		}*/
+		    table[bits] = func
+		    //};
+		    //rv
+		};
+		($name:ident as ! $panic_msg:literal) => {
+		    #[inline(never)]
+		    #[cold]
+		    fn _panic_with_msg() -> ! {
+			panic!($panic_msg)
+		    }
+		    set!($name => |_, _| _panic_with_msg()) 
+		};
+		($name:ident: $($func_body:tt)+) => {
+		    set!($name => |path, filename| { $($func_body)+})
+		}
+	    }
+	    
+	    set!(NAME_MATCH as ! "This should already have been checked");
+	    set!(NON_SYMLINK => |path: &Path, _| !path.is_symlink());
+	    set!(NON_EXEC => |path, _| {
+		use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+		use readable_perms::{
+		    User,
+		    Bit,
+		};
+		const EXEC_BIT: u32 =
+		    User::Group.mode(Bit::Execute)
+		    | User::Other.mode(Bit::Execute)
+		    | User::Owner.mode(Bit::Execute);
+		path.metadata()
+		    .map(|meta| meta.permissions().mode() & EXEC_BIT == 0) //TODO: XXX: Test this.
+		    .unwrap_or(false)
+	    });
+	    set!(NON_WORLD_WRITABLE => |path, _| {
+		use readable_perms::{
+		    PermissionsExt as _,
+		    User,
+		    Bit,
+		};
+		path.metadata()
+		    .map(|meta| !meta.permissions().unix().has_mask(User::Other, Bit::Write))
+		    .unwrap_or(false)
+	    });
+	    set!(ROOT_OWNED_ONLY => |path, _| {
+		use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt as _;
+		path.metadata()
+		    .map(|meta| meta.uid() == 0)
+		    .unwrap_or(false)
+	    });
+	    set!(USER_OWNED_ONLY => |path, _| {
+		use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt as _;
+		extern "C" {
+		    fn getuid() -> u32; // uid_t
+		    //XXX: Should we use process's UID or EUID? It seems we should use EUID.
+		    fn geteuid() -> u32; // uid_t
+		}
+		// SAFETY: This is a pure function for all that matters.
+		let user_id = unsafe { geteuid() };
+		path.metadata()
+		    .map(move |meta| meta.uid() == user_id)
+		    .unwrap_or(false)
+	    });
+	    set!(USER_ACCESSIBLE_ONLY => |path, _| {
+		//Only Owner should be able to read, write, or execute.
+		use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+		use readable_perms::{
+		    User,
+		    Bit,
+		};
+		const BIT_ANY: Bit =
+		    Bit::Read
+		    .union(Bit::Write)
+		    .union(Bit::Execute);
+		const OTHER_ACCESSORS: u32 =
+		    User::Group.mode(BIT_ANY)
+		    | User::Other.mode(BIT_ANY);
+		path.metadata()
+		    .map(|meta| !meta.permissions().mode() & OTHER_ACCESSORS == 0) //XXX: Test this
+		    .unwrap_or(false)
+	    });
+	    //TODO: Composition of functions should be done via OR, how to insert all possible compositions into table? We get confusing error messages when we try inside `set!()`
+	    table
+	}
+    }
+
     impl Default for UntrustedPathRules
     {
 	#[inline]
@@ -103,10 +252,10 @@ pub mod locations {
 
     /// Should symlinks be followed in a recursive lookup. (0 is for trusted paths, 1 is for untrusted)
     pub static LOOKUP_PATH_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS: (bool, bool) = (true, false); 
-    
+
     /// Trust plugin file lookups in non-contained `LOOKUP_PATH_HOME_BASE_NAME`s.
     pub static LOOKUP_PATH_TRUST_HOME: bool = false;
-    
+
     /// Base paths from user home to look-up plugin name.
     pub static LOOKUP_PATH_HOME_BASE_NAME: &[PathTrust] = &[
 	Trusted(".rngcli/plugins/"),
@@ -114,7 +263,7 @@ pub mod locations {
 	Untrusted(".config/rngcli/").map_trust(LOOKUP_PATH_TRUST_HOME),
 	Untrusted(".config/").map_trust(LOOKUP_PATH_TRUST_HOME),
     ];
-    
+
     /// Extra valid lookup paths
     pub static LOOKUP_PATH_EXTRA_PATHS: &[PathTrust] = &[
 	Trusted("/usr/share/rngcli/"),
@@ -142,7 +291,7 @@ pub mod locations {
 	r"\.rngp\.so$",
 	r"\.rngp$",
     ];
-    
+
     /// These rules must be met for lookups in untrusted paths.
     pub static LOOKUP_UNTRUSTED_PATH_RULES: UntrustedPathRules =
 	UntrustedPathRules::NAME_MATCH
@@ -238,7 +387,25 @@ impl PathLookup
 	fn validate_file_untrusted(path: &Path, filename: &str) -> bool
 	{
 	    // By this point, `filename` has already matched successfully.
-	    // Also Note: `filename` is just the basename of `path` as an `&str` (same address-space.)
+	    // Also Note: `filename` is just the basename of `path` as an `&str` (aliasing address-space.)
+	    use locations::UntrustedPathRules as Rule;
+	    use locations::LOOKUP_UNTRUSTED_PATH_RULES as RULES;
+
+	    let mut bit = Rule::INACCESSIBLE.bits();
+
+	    // No rules
+	    if bit == 0 /* `Rule::UNRESTRICTED` */ {
+		return true;
+	    }
+
+	    while bit > 0
+	    {
+		// SAFETY: We know `INACCESSIBLE` is the largest
+		if RULES.contains(unsafe { Rule::from_bits_unchecked(bit) }) {
+		    
+		}
+		bit >>= 1;
+	    }
 	    
 	    todo!("TODO: extra Untrusted lookup rules checked on `path` here.")
 	}
@@ -251,42 +418,43 @@ impl PathLookup
 	
 	let path = path.as_ref();
 
+	// Check if the path:
+	//  * Exists
+	//  * Is not a directory
+	// NOTE: We don't use `.is_file()` here, because we want to support symlinks and pseudofiles in trusted contexts, which `is_file()` reports as false.
+	
+	// TODO: XXX: Maybe in the future allow directories to be plugins; they would contain a manifest, and each `.so` file in the directory will be loaded in order specified by the directory's manifest.
 	if !path.exists() || path.is_dir() {
 	    return false;
 	}
 
+	// Attempt to extract the filename, return false if it is invalid UTF8.
 	let filename = match path.file_name()
 	    .and_then(|os_fn| os_fn.to_str())
 	{
 	    Some(f) => f,
 	    _ => return false,
 	};
-
-	// 	trait Checker // XXX: Was used for dynamic dispatch in the `if Trusted ...` block below, but is no longer needed as Trusted will never have one, and untrusted will always have the same one; we can just use Option<impl FnOnce> pretty much
-	// 	{
-	// 	    fn check_path(self, path: &Path) -> bool;
-	// 	}
-	// 	/*struct NoChecker;
-	// 	impl Checker for NoChecker { #[inline] fn check_path(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
-	// 	true
-	// } }*/
-
-	// 	#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
-	// 	struct FuncChecker<F: FnOnce(&Path) -> bool>(F);
-	// 	impl<F: FnOnce(&Path) -> bool> Checker for FuncChecker<F>
-	// 	{
-	// 	    #[inline] 
-	// 	    fn check_path(self, path: &Path) -> bool {
-	// 		self.0(path)
-	// 	    }
-	// 	}
+	
+	// Get the name matcher and rule checker for the file.
 	
 	let (matcher, checker) = if TRUSTED {
 	    // Trusted path lookup
 	    (match_any(TRUSTED_EXT_REGEX_MAP.iter()), None)//&NoChecker)
 	} else {
 	    // Untrusted path lookup
-	    (match_any(UNTRUSTED_EXT_REGEX_MAP.iter()), Some(move |path| {
+	    
+	    let matcher =  if locations::LOOKUP_UNTRUSTED_PATH_RULES
+		.contains(locations::UntrustedPathRules::NAME_MATCH)
+	    {
+		// Name must match
+		match_any(UNTRUSTED_EXT_REGEX_MAP.iter())
+	    } else {
+		// Name needn't match
+		match_any(TRUSTED_EXT_REGEX_MAP.iter())
+	    };
+	    
+	    (matcher, Some(move |path| {
 		validate_file_untrusted(path, filename)
 	    }))
 	};